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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Numerous spatial developments on a limited surface, complex relations, different responsi-
bilities and an abundance of parties and interests; spatial planning in the Netherlands is a chal-
lenge. The possibilities of the Dutch government to decide solitary on the desired spatial de-
velopments are limited. The Dutch ‘Nota Ruimte’ (Area Development Bill), which is recently 
made public, presents a different philosophy. This policy document takes active involvement 
of stakeholders as a starting-point, facilitates new initiatives of stakeholders and pays atten-
tion to the actual implementation. The overall idea is: ‘We can’t do it by our selves’. 
 
This philosophy is also named –ontwikkelingsplanologie- (Dammers 2004)
1. It implicates an 
important change in the perspective on the roles of governments, namely the transition from 
vertical to horizontal relations. Where governments used to see themselves as the central actor 
in the policy making process, at this moment emphasis has shifted to an attitude in which 
governments develop the policy together with private parties, interest groups and citizens. 
Teamwork and co-production between these parties will result in enrichment of initiatives, 
more implementation power, involvement and legitimacy of decisions. 
 
In the following section we will describe some theoretical backgrounds of co-production. In 
section 3 different arrangements of co-production and their results will be analysed for our 
three cases Spaanse Polder (the restructuring of an industrial area), Gelderse Vallei (the re-
construction of a rural area) and Vathorst (the development of a new housing area)2. In sec-
tion 4 conclusions will be drawn.  
 
                                                  
1 This Dutch concept is more or less similar to the concept of collaborative planning. 
2 The case material for this paper is adapted from a report that is prepared for the Dutch Ministy 
of Spatial Planning by Berenschot.   3 
2.  CO-PRODUCTION 
Integrated area development projects have in common that they surpass the values, interests 
and possibilities of the individual parties (Klijn, 1996). Projects like the development of a new 
housing area (Vathorst), the restructuring of an industrial area (Spaanse Polder) and the re-
construction of a rural area (Gelderse Vallei) cannot be executed by the (decentral) govern-
ments single handedly. There is a consensus about the fact that top-down models (that state 
one organisation as superior and vertically on top) are often inadequate when it comes to deal-
ing with area development projects (Teisman, 2001).  
 
The Netherlands lack a centre for policy making and societal steering that’s powerful enough 
to  force  a  solution  exclusively.  Although  many  parties  usually  are  capable  of  preventing 
themselves from being forced to do something they do not agree with, these parties usually do 
not have ‘realisation power’ themselves. Considering the almost inevitable dependency on 
other parties, it is necessary to look for partnerships, coalitions and alliances. It is also neces-
sary because none of the parties is capable to oversee all relevant aspects of a problem. The 
degree of complexity and dynamics are too high. Furthermore it is relevant to understand that 
innovation (attributing to solutions for complex problems) originates from unexpected places, 
often on the edges of present institutions and organisations. Local policy is increasingly being 
developed and implemented in co-production between a great number of parties.  
 
Co-production is a term that can be used to describe that citizens, private companies, interest 
groups and other organisations in the public and private spheres can make important contribu-
tions in the design and realisation of policies in spatial development (Tops, 1996 and 2000). 
Co-production implies a specific approach to the administrative practice in city and region. In 
this approach actors are constantly looking for coalitions and alliances between actors in the 
public and private sphere. Their active co-operation is needed for successful policymaking 
(Teisman, e.a., 2004). Co-production is a method that expresses shared involvement and re-
sponsibilities. In this way co-production implies a transition from vertical to horizontal rela-
tionships between parties. 
 
The advantages of co-production seem evident: enrichment of initiatives, more implementa-
tion and realisation power, involvement of stakeholders and legitimacy of decisions. Giving   4 
residents, interest groups and private parties more control and responsibilities on the problems 
in their own streets and neighbourhoods, increases the feeling of being responsible for their 
own environment. It can be assumed that professionals and other policy experts could also 
have developed the ideas, initiatives, propositions and suggestions that are developed in the 
process of co-production themselves. Nevertheless, these ideas, initiatives, propositions and 
suggestions are given meaning and status by the fact that they are being developed in interac-
tion between stakeholders who have their own views and opinions. The assumption is that ac-
tors that participated in the process of co-production will not easily use their powers to ham-
per the process in the implementation phase.  
 
Co-production processes take place between actors with different backgrounds, views, opin-
ions and interests. Each process may require the involvement of a different set of actors de-
pending on the local situation. In general co-production processes can be categorised in the 
following way (see: Twist and Kort 2005): 
 
1.  Co-production between governments; local, regional, central, et cetera. 
2.  Co-production between governments and the civil society. The civil society can be de-
fined as the composition of individuals, organisations and institutions that cannot be con-
sidered already involved public or private parties. In this respect one can think of co-
operation with civilians, but also mosks, privately-owned foundations and so on. 
3.  Co-production between governments and companies and other profit-institutions (or more 
general: private parties). This can be formalised in agreements, contracts, or in organisa-
tional arrangements in which both types of parties participate. 
 
Study of co-production in practice shows that in each project different combinations of the 
above  categories  are  chosen.  In  other  words  each  project  designs  its  own  specific  co-
production arrangement. The case studies prove this (see next sections).  
 
Although the expectations of co-production are high, the realisation of integrated area devel-
opment projects in practice is difficult. Co-production and partnership are words that are as-
sociated with sympathy and warmth at first, but in daily practice they seem to be difficult to 
realise and maintain (Van Twist, 2001). Interests do not correspond, responsibilities conflict, 
information is dispersed, rationalities diverge, conceptions about the urgency of problems dif-
fer and ideas of the desired direction change constantly.    5 
 
Behind the euphoria about the need to co-operate written down in policy documents, plans, 
agreements and visions on development, critical comments on the difficult practice of co-
production, co-operation, alliancing and partnering can be heard. Parties start to complain 
about conversations without commitments (‘poldering’) and ‘talkshows’ in which no progress 
is made. Everyone intervenes in everything. And all of a sudden everyone has to talk to eve-
rybody. Processes continue for a long time without resulting in a concrete progress. Sluggish-
ness is one of the mayor complaints in our country (Hendriks en Toonen, 1998). 
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3.  CO-PRODUCTION IN PRACTICE; A CASE COMPARISON 
In this section we will explore the ‘co-production arrangements’ in three cases:  
·  Vathorst, the development of a new housing area. 
·  Spaanse Polder, the restructuring of an industrial area. 
·  Gelderse Vallei, the reconstruction of a rural area.  
 
Although each case is different in task, in each case the need for co-production is evident. For 
each case the choices, assessments and results are described. In table 3.1 a short overview of 
the cases is presented. 
 
Table 3.1: overview of the cases 
  Spaanse Polder  Gelderse Vallei  Vathorst 
Project  Restructuring of an indus-
trial area. 
Reconstruction  of  a  rural 
area. 
The development of a new 
housing area (VINEX). 
Objective  Improving  spatial  and 
economic structures of the 
area,  included  safety  and 
environment for living. 
Improving  spatial  and  eco-
nomic structures of the area. 
Expenditure: realisation of 
a  comfortable  living  and 
working  environment  for 
30.000 people. 
Actors   The  cities  of  Rotterdam 
and  Schiedam  together 
take on the restructuring. 
The  regional  and  the  na-
tional governments are fa-
cilitating  especially  finan-
cial.  
Interest  group  Spaanse 
Polder (BVSP). 
Local  entrepreneurs  (700) 
and  citizens  (few)  are 
asked to participate in the 
process. 
The provinces of Gelderland 
and Utrecht. 
Ten  surrounding  communi-
ties and a water board.  
National  government  are 
subsidizing. 
All sorts of social groups. 
The  SVGV  Foundation  in 
which  the  participants  are 
represented  plays  a  central 
role. 
 The city of Amersfoort as 
initiator. 
The  regional  and  the  na-
tional governments are in-
volved (Vinex). 
Private  organisations,  so-
cial groups and citizens. 
 
Situation  Ending the phase of plan- Planning is finished, imple- Realisation  of  houses,  of-  7 
ning,  parts  of  the  project 
are  already  being  imple-
mented or are already fin-
ished. 
mentation  leads  to  discus-
sion. 
fices and infrastructures is 
being completed. 
 
In the following paragraphs the cases will be explored in more detail. 
 
3.1  SPAANSE POLDER THE RESTRUCTURING OF AN INDUSTRIAL AREA 
3.1.1  Background 
This project is about the restructuring of two neighbouring industrial areas: Spaanse Polder 
and ‘s-Graveland-Zuid. It is about restructuring in the meaning of spatial restructuring, but 
also in the meaning of functional restructuring. Spatial restructuring includes improvement of 
the infrastructure, development of grounds, the removing of social and cultural facilities and 
boats people live on, and moving businesses to other locations. Functional restructuring is 
about safety, environment, crime and co-operation. The total surface of both the areas of 
Spaanse Polder and ‘s-Graveland-Zuid is about 200 ha. Approximately 700 entrepreneurs are 
settled in this area. They vary from small to moderate and large and from light to heavy envi-
ronmental categories. Spaanse Polder ans ‘s-Graveland-Zuid are settled in both the Rotterdam 
(90%) and Schiedam (10%) area.  This is the reason why these cities are co-operating in this 
project. Both cities are the principals of their own area. 
 
The industrial area finds itself in a downward spiral. Promising businesses move out and va-
cancy is the effect. This vacancy is being filled by a couple of businesses that could also, or 
even better, be settled outside of the industrial area or by unreliable entrepreneurs. This nega-
tive movement of the departure of successful and promising businesses, the vacancy and the 
settling of businesses who are not part of the target group of the industrial area, has to be 
changed. The objective of the restructuring project is to reform the areas of Spaanse Polder 
and ‘s-Graveland-Zuid in about 15 years into a modern and mixed industrial area. 
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3.1.2  Co-production arrangement 
The initiators of the restructuring are the cities of Rotterdam and Schiedam. From the start of 
the project, the two cities are working along side at diverse levels: preservation actions, com-
munication policy, making of the development plan, spatial planning, et cetera. The agree-
ments are fixed in a contract. For the implementation, both cities have their own organisation. 
For parts of the project within the area of both cities, joint project teams are formed. 
 
In the area 700 entrepreneurs are working. They are represented by five different interest 
groups. Also a lot of entrepreneurs are not represented by an interest group at all. To organise 
some form of co-ordination one interest group is created in which all previous mentioned 
groups are united. This interest group is named Belangen Vereniging Spaanse Polder. This 
group is involved in the planning process. Before formal decision making process begins, en-
trepreneurs get the chance to react at the plans. The way participation of entrepreneurs gets 
shape is in other words consultation.  
 
Regional, national and supranational governments are mainly involved in the role of subsidis-
ing parties. They are following the developments and try to facilitate if possible. The Ministry 
of Economics is the co-ordinating Ministry.  
 
3.1.3  Observations 
The two local governments find that the present co-operation has positive results: each coun-
cil does his share of the project and the mutual adjustment runs smoothly. A more integrated 
form of co-operation, like a mutual project organisation and ground exploitation could be 
more effective, but this possibility is not examined thoroughly. The co-production arrange-
ment that was chosen was politically feasible, a more integrated arrangement was not ex-
pected to be politically feasible.  
 
The strategy of both city councils in the restructuring is a strategy of mutual actions in the 
spheres of maintenance, parts of the projects where opportunities come to light, and tactical 
acquiring and developing. They have begun at the spots where the problems were most obvi-
ous. They have not chosen for an integral redevelopment with wholesale acquiring because 
this would be financially impossible to realise. 
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The preferable participation of both the municipalities of Schiedam and Rotterdam and the 
BVSP is more ‘joint fact-finding and decision making’. Until now this is not realised in prac-
tice. The two local governments are disappointed in the lack of initiatives from the entrepre-
neurs. They expected entrepreneurs to develop all kinds of initiatives and more involvement. 
On the other hand the entrepreneurs are unsure about their actual role and influence in the 
process. “Can we actually have any influence? The plans are already definitive, aren’t they?”   
 
This problem is more widely spread in the restructuring of industrial areas. Entrepreneurs dis-
trust governments and vice versa. Entrepreneurs see government as opponents that they need 
for acquiring permits and licenses and collect taxes. A government that invites entrepreneurs 
to actively participate in the policymaking process is a new way of behaving from the point of 
view of the entrepreneurs. It takes time to get used to the idea of a government as a partner. 
Furthermore entrepreneurs are mostly occupied by the continuity of their own businesses. Es-
pecially in bad economical circumstances, interactive policymaking is not the main focus of 
the entrepreneurs, unless the restructuring reaches their front door. Other entrepreneurs that 
are established in the Spaanse Polder area have no direct interest in the restructuring of the 
industrial area at all: they perform some illegal activities, or have to adapt their activities ac-
cording to environmental regulation that is more strictly enforced in the restructuring process.  
 
The above mentioned factors explain why the ‘seduction’ of entrepreneurs to actively partici-
pate in the process is not easy for governments. It also explains why the total amount of 
members of the BVSP is somewhat disappointing and consequently the availability of suffi-
cient means for them to play an active role. 
 
3.2  GELDERSE VALLEI; THE RECONSTRUCTION OF A RURAL AREA 
3.2.1  Background 
The reconstruction area Gelderse Vallei/Utrecht-Oost is a unique region in the Netherlands. It 
includes a low, wet valley, located between two dikes dating back from the ice age. The 
flanks and gradients together create a special landscape with cultural, historical and natural 
values. The surface of the area is about 104.000 ha, includes 24 municipalities and has ap-
proximately 850.000 inhabitants.  4.500 agricultural firms are located in the area, which alto-
gether encloses 50.000 ha. Approximately half of this region is designated as National Park.   10 
The rest is mainly urban area, water and infrastructure. Looking more closely at the Gelderse 
Vallei we see that that agriculture, nature, living and working, are in each other’s way.  The 
restructuring assignment is to develop a new spatial structure in which agriculture, nature, 
bushes, landscape, recreation, water, environment and infrastructure are well combined. Be-
sides that, the living and working environment also have to be improved. 
 
3.2.2  Co-production arrangement 
The Renewal Foundation Gelderse Vallei (SVGV) plays a central role in the reconstruction 
process. The involved local governments, regional waterboards, and interest groups are work-
ing together in this foundation, on the domains of agriculture, nature, environment, water, rec-
reation, economics and livability. The foundation staffs a bureau (Programmabureau Vallei) 
and functions as reconstruction commission. The board of SVGV is advisor of the provinces 
Gelderland and Utrecht. The SVGV also is the main composer of the reconstruction plan. 
 
The power of the SVGV seems to be the independent position in the area. Because many pri-
vate actors in the region are sceptical about the role of the government, the independent posi-
tion of the foundation is criticised as positive. The SVGV built a better track record as source 
of information for stakeholders than the local or regional authorities. The SVGV is seen as 
authoritative and easily accessible partner in development. SVGV plays different roles and 
has an intermediary position between regional actors as agriculture and environment organisa-
tions, counsels and the provinces Gelderland and Utrecht.  
 
3.2.3  Observations 
The strength of the SVGV is in its easy accessibility and its independent position in the re-
gion. Regional parties, farmers, nature organisations and local companies come to SVGV if 
they want to develop a project in the area. Parties recognise the SVGV as a partner in devel-
opment, rather than the regional authorities. Besides that SVGV is a platform for debate be-
tween regional parties. The SVGV has an intermediary position between regional actors as 
agriculture and environmental groups, councils and the provinces Gelderland and Utrecht. 
The SVGV is capable of identifying and coupling interests because of its broad involvement 
in society that is driven bottom-up. An example is the way SVGV dealt with a pigfarm in the 
area. In this case SVGV coupled and recombined interests, actors and functions. SVGV de-  11 
veloped a solution in which the owner of the farm received a financial profitable arrangement 
for closure which resulted in less emission and new possibilities for nature development and 
rural living more value the closure of and in return. 
 
Recently a discussion has risen about the role of the SVGV in the implementation phase. New 
regulation, the Investment Budget Rural Area (ILG) that is expected to be in effect in 2007, 
gives more control to the provinces. As a consequence the question is raised what this means 
for the position of SVGV. From SVGV’s point of view, the provinces are responsible for the 
implementation, but the real implementation should be done at the level of the local involved 
parties. This means more or less the continuation of the existing role of SVGV with its discre-
tionary powers. The two involved provinces hold differing opinions. The province of Gelder-
land requires increased supervision on the activities of SVGV and the expenditure of recon-
struction funds. However, Utrecht is willing to give the regional parties some space and free-
dom and sees SVGV as a vital actor in the prosperity of the reconstruction.  
 
SVGV says that increased supervision may limit the social initiatives in the area. Perhaps giv-
ing SVGV power of a governmental body offers a way out. At this moment the foundation 
implements public tasks while it is a non-governmental organisation and is not formally ju-
ridical prepared and identified.  
 
3.3  VATHORST; THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW URBAN AREA 
3.3.1  Background 
Vathorst is a new Amersfoort district, to be realised between 2001 and 2014. In this district 
11.000 houses, a 45 ha business area and 100.000 m2 office location with necessary provi-
sions (care, education, sports, culture, shopping malls and a railway station) will be realised. 
An important part of the programme is integrating an existing village. Other particular ele-
ments of the project are the railway station, the connection to the main infrastructures (the A1 
and A28 highways) and the office location. The latter is a project that aims at multifunctional 
and intensive land use applications: the offices are to be built into a noise barrier. 
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Vathorst  is  a  Vinex-location.  Targets  for  reducing  housing  shortage  are  described  in  an 
agreement between the State and the Province of Utrecht, closed on July the first, 2004. The 
planning area of Vathorst, in the city of Amersfoort, is one of the building locations marked in 
order to realise these targets. This resulted in an agreement between the province and the city 
of Amersfoort. Amersfoort found partners for further development of the area. With these 
partners, a development plan was conceived, dividing the Vathorst area into smaller areas.  
 
Further development and realisation is carried out in separate plans for each smaller area. To-
day, one third of the programme is realised. The ultimate goal of the whole project is creating 
a comfortable living and working area with approximately 30.000 inhabitants and 5000 jobs. 
 
3.3.2  Co-production arrangement 
To develop the area, a PPP-construction was created. This PPP includes the city of Amers-
foort, four developers (Bouwfonds, Heijmans, Dura Vermeer en AM Vastgoed) and a housing 
association (de Alliantie). Amersfoort itself is developer of 1/7
th part of the housing pro-
gramme in the commercial sector, the whole of the social sector and all non-commercial pro-
visions. It was explicitly decided to organise some distance between the PPP for the develop-
ment of Vathorst and local government. Amersfoort is no longer responsible for everything, 
but uses qualities available on the market instead.  
 
The province of Utrecht was dominant in starting the Vathorst development. While finishing 
other expansion districts in the area, the province foresaw more urbanisation was needed. 
Province policy was – and still is – that this urbanisation should take place within the urban 
district of Utrecht and Amersfoort. This policy aims to protect the province’s vulnerable green 
zones. 
 
The role of national government in the Vathorst development is not easy to point out, because 
national government has to attend to various interests. For example: the Ministry of Spatial 
Planning wants to realise comfortable housing in a high-quality environment by pointing out a 
VINEX-location, but has to solve dredging problems as well.  
 
Interest  groups  (named  Samenwerkende  Groeperingen  Leefbaar  Amersfoort  and 
Hooglanderveen) are involved in the process, but they don’t take part in the PPP. They had a   13 
role in creating the development plan. They were consulted. In the process they did not realise 
all of the targets important to them. They did succeed however in upgrading existing provi-
sions - and creating new provisions - in Hooglanderveen, as well as in realising some extra 
infrastructural connections, limiting short-cut traffic. 
 
3.3.3  Observations 
The parties involved in the PPP all indicate that the co-operation is satisfactory. There is re-
spect amongst the partners and no pushing one another into conflicts. When the PPP was 
founded and the development plan established the activities that followed were labelled ‘im-
plementation’, thus creating some distance to politics. Particularly the private parties involved 
find this a major factor to succeed.  
 
Parties see the city’s role as distantly or closely committed, depending on their position in the 
field. To the city, taking part in the PPP is active ground-policy. They are after all a risk bear-
ing partner in the process, giving advice and taking part in several working parties and plan-
ning teams. For the private parties consider their role distant, because not every decision made 
by the PPP has to be put to the City Council. 
 
Co-operation between administrative parties can be judged mediocre. The ministry of Spatial 
Planning and the Ministry of Transport and Public Works disagreed on the way the infrastruc-
tural opening up of Vathorst should be arranged. Province and city disagreed on whether to 
realise or not realise a new expansion of Amersfoort. The internal co-ordination of the public 
organisations was not all it could be. Within Spatial Planning, as well as within the Province, 
colliding decisions were made considering one and the same Vathorst. This is particularly il-
lustrated in the problems considering the dredging depot.  
 
At one hand, the PPP can be considered successful, on the other hand there are some compli-
cations. First of all, the European Commission criticised the founding process of the PPP. It is 
considered contrary to European tender regulations. Second of all, the old planning proce-
dures and the WRO still in force made it possible for private parties to gain ground positions 
in building areas. For private parties involved in the prior building projects, their close com-
mitment made it easy to be in the picture for Vathorst. Finally, the distant role of the City 
Council led to discussions over the democratic nature of decisions made.   14 
4.  CONCLUSION 
From the case studies it can be seen that in each project different choices are made for the de-
sign of the co-production arrangement. In the table 4.2 the cases are assessed on the categories 
of co-production that we mentioned in the above: 
·  Co-production between governments; 
·  Co-production between governments and civil society; 
·  Co-production between governments and private parties; 
 
Table 4.2: co-production in the cases 




Co-production  between 
two local governments 
Provinces and central gov-
ernment facilitate and sub-
sidise local government 
All  relevant  local  govern-
ments participate in SVGV 
SVGV is advisor of the two 
provinces 
No co-production between 
governments 
Central  government  is  in-
volved  in  the  planning 




ments  and 
civil society 
Interest  group  of  compa-
nies  (BVSP)  is  consulted. 
Active involvement is hard 
to realise.  
Interest groups participate in 
SVGV 
Interest  groups  and  civil-
ians have a role in the de-
sign  of  a  development 




ments  and 
private 
parties 
The  individual  companies 
are consulted. 
No  co-production  with 
other  private  parties  like 
developers et cetera.   
Local  companies  work  to-
gether  with  SVGV  in  the 
realisation of projects  
No co-production with other 
private parties like develop-
ers et cetera. 
PPP  between  local  gov-




From the table it can be derived that each case has it’s own co-production arrangement: 
·  In Spaanse Polder two local governments develop the plans and (the interest groups of) 
companies are consulted.    15 
·  In Gelderse Vallei local governments and interest groups developed a reconstruction plan.  
Local companies perceive SVGV as partner to realise projects. 
·  In Vathorst co-production is realised in the public-private partnership between local gov-
ernment, developers and the housing association. 
 
Each of these arrangements has its own problems and successes. The problems and successes 
are described in table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 problems and successes 
  Spaanse Polder  Gelderse Vallei  Vathorst 
Problems  How to activate the com-
pany  owners  in  the  co-
production process?  
How to involve developers 
and  other  private  compa-
nies 
Relationship  between 
SVGV  and  the  provinces? 
Who decides on what? 
Relationship between PPS 
and the municipal council 
Possible  conflict  between 
the  designed  PPS  and 
European regulation   
Successes  Co-production  between 
two local governments  
The position and realisation 
power SVGV earned in the 
process (matchmaker) 
Organising  capacity  and 
realisation power 
 
In the cases Spaanse Polder and Gelderse Vallei, one sees that aldermen at first are reluctant 
with new, innovative constructions. There is a constant tension between ‘controlling’ on the 
one hand and ‘granting moving ground’ on the other. For administrators, judging innovative 
constructions and horizontal co-operation by their true merits demands practice and some 
form  of  administrative  intelligence.  What  is  the  right  balance  between  ‘granting  moving 
ground’ and control? And how to deal with accountability? In the Vathorst case, the City’s 
experience with such constructions made a decision easier on the PPP-construcntion.. 
 
Horizontal co-operation in the public and private sphere can cause accountability problems in 
the relation between the City council and the alderman. Co-operation in equality demands a 
strong mandate for portfolio-holders. This can collide with the changing insights and compo-
sition of the council.   16 
What all three cases have in common is that local government is intensively involved; in 
Spaanse Polder and Vathorst as initiators, in Gelderse Vallei as one of the parties that partici-
pate in SVGV. This can lead to the conclusion that local government should always have in-
tensive involvement to achieve efficient co-production. If this is true it would imply that local 
government is always the party that makes the difference (and the involvement of other par-
ties can make none).  
 
We explicitly don’t draw this conclusion. Instead, one can argue that the intensive involve-
ment the two local governments in Spaanse Polder hinders involvement of company owners. 
Policies of local government are often not the reason why innovations are happening. The at-
tention at the level of local politics mostly is attracted (because of bigger and smaller inci-
dents) to the contrary: regulation and accountability, planning and control, conditions and 
procedures that should safeguard that nothing is overlooked, everything is been taken care of 
and (better than before) can be controlled. 
 
Who knows what something like a SVGV in this case could have achieved; in the Gelderse 
Vallei it created a far more inviting environment for co-production. That is what Spaanse Pol-
der needs. From local government this demands granting moving ground, which is not self-
evident as also can be seen in the Gelderse Vallei case. Of course there is more to it than that 
alone in the Spaanse Polder. The particular kind of entrepreneurs and the enormous financial 
deficits cause the other private parties to hesitate in taking part in the co-production.  
 
We conclude by saying that it is self-evident that governments are part of the process. But it 
should be no longer always and automatically the central starting point when it comes to co-
production. There should be more attention for initiatives for co-production and partnerships 
between other organisations without a local government directly involved. For example pri-
vate parties (companies) and organisations that are part of the civil society. An example can 
be social housing organisations that in public-private partnership with nursing-homes try to 
reduce the waiting lists in health care. Another example is an institution for homeless people 
that decides to provide study facilities in co-operation with a regional educational institution. 
A final example is an educational farm that no longer is exclusively providing agrarian activi-
ties but at the same time organises daycare for the handicapped as a result of decision making 
in the deliberative democracy.  
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The focus on these profit- and ‘not for profit’ organisations as a bottom-up approach compen-
sates for the top down bureaucratic image of reality and the established interests of adminis-
trative institutions that can sometimes still dominate the policy debate and the practice of co-
production. Governments should facilitate these initiatives as much as possible when they oc-
cur.   
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